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High trait anxious individuals tend to show biased processing of threat. Correlational 
evidence suggests that executive control could be used to regulate such threat-processing. On 
this basis, we hypothesised that trait anxiety-related cognitive biases regarding threat should 
be exaggerated when executive control is experimentally impaired by loading working 
memory. In Study 1, 68 undergraduates read ambiguous vignettes under high and low 
working memory load; later, their interpretations of these vignettes were assessed via a 
recognition test. Trait anxiety predicted biased interpretation of social threat vignettes under 
high working memory load, but not under low working memory load. In Study 2, 53 
undergraduates completed a dot probe task with fear-conditioned Japanese characters serving 
as threat stimuli. Trait anxiety predicted attentional bias to the threat stimuli but, again, this 
only occurred under high working memory load. Interestingly however, actual eye 
movements toward the threat stimuli were only associated with state anxiety and this was not 
moderated by working memory load, suggesting that executive control regulates biased 
threat-processing downstream of initial input processes such as orienting. These results 
suggest that cognitive loads can exacerbate trait anxiety-related cognitive biases, and 
therefore represent a useful tool for assessing cognitive biases in future research. More 
importantly, since biased threat-processing has been implicated in the aetiology and 
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Working Memory Regulates Trait Anxiety-Related Threat Processing Biases 
 
There are two major cognitive features of trait anxiety. Firstly, trait anxious 
individuals show cognitive biases regarding potential threats (see e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005, for a review). For example, they show an attentional bias toward threat-related stimuli 
(Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007), and an 
interpretive bias so that ambiguous stimuli and situations are understood in a threatening way 
(Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Secondly, they show deficits 
in executive cognitive control and working memory (WM; Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). As both features are reliably found in trait 
anxious individuals, it is reasonable to ask whether there is some link between them.  
One theoretical approach which has addressed this issue is attentional control theory 
(Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck et al., 2007). This theory focuses on executive control 
and performance deficits in both state anxious and trait anxious individuals, but also 
discusses cognitive bias. The theory assumes that anxious individuals display a weakness in 
top-down attentional control (relative to bottom-up, more reflexive control), and weaknesses 
in the inhibition and shifting functions of the central executive component of WM (see 
Miyake et al., 2000, for a taxonomy of executive functions). Importantly for the present 
discussion, the theory also states that DQ[LRXVLQGLYLGXDOV¶LQKLELWLRQVKRXOGEHHVSHFLDOO\
impaired in the presence of threat stimuli. Cognitive biases are attributed to a failure to inhibit 
bottom-up orienting towards salient, threatening stimuli; they are a failure of attentional 
control (see also Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007). If this is correct, then anxiety-related 
cognitive biases should be even more apparent when executive control ability is impaired.  
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A similar position is advanced by Mathews and MacLeod (2005, see also Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998). They suggest trait anxious individualV¶ attention might be biased toward 
goal-irrelevant threat stimuli, while executive attentional control works to keep attention 
focused on task-relevant stimuli (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Congruently, Ouimet, 
Gawronski, and Dozois (2009) suggested that interpretive bias in trait anxiety is the result of 
relatively associative (i.e., relatively uncontrolled) valence judgements: interpretation does 
not necessarily require many cognitive resources (Chun, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2002, Study 
1). It is therefore the responsibility of executive control processes to rein in inappropriate 
interpretations. These formulations are consistent with emotion regulation theories (see 
Koole, van Dillen, & Sheppes, 2011) suggesting that executive control is used to regulate 
associative emotional processing when such processing is undesirable (Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; see 
also Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993).  
All of these similar theoretical positions yield the hypothesis that reduced executive 
control should exaggerate the influences of trait anxiety on cognitive bias. For example, 
reducing executive control resources might make individual differences in interpretation 
more apparent (Salemink & Wiers, 2012):KHUHDVWLPXOXV¶VWKUHDWYDOXHLVLUUHOHYDQW
associative processes may activate a threatening or benign interpretation of the stimulus 
depending on the inGLYLGXDO¶V trait anxiety level, but either interpretation would be regulated 
by executive control in all individuals (cf. Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003). Similarly, 
VLQFHWUDLWDQ[LRXVLQGLYLGXDOV¶attentional bias is not typically adaptive, executive control 
would be used to regulate or override it. Impaired executive control should make the bias 
more apparent.  
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Several studies have tested this hypothesis using an individual-differences approach. 
Most have assessed attentional control using self-report measures: Derryberry and Reed 
(2002) found that only high trait anxiety, low attentional control participants showed 
attentional bias to threat; Helzer, Connor-Smith and Reed (2009) DQG6XVD%HQJD3LWLFăDQG
Miclea (2014) found that fearful temperament only predicted attentional bias to threat in 
participants scoring low on attentional control; Lonigan and Vasey (2009) found that only 
schoolchildren high in negative affectivity and low in control showed attentional bias to 
threat. Bardeen and Orcutt (2011) found that low attentional control predicted bias in 
participants with higher posttraumatic stress symptoms. On the other hand, Schoorl, Putman, 
van der Werff, and van der Does (2014) found that posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms 
were associated with attentional bias away from threat in patients with low attentional 
control. Turning to interpretive bias, Muris, Meesters and Rompelberg (2006, footnote 2) 
IRXQGQRLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQDWWHQWLRQDOFRQWURODQGQHXURWLFLVPRQFKLOGUHQ¶VLQWHUSUHWLYH
bias.  
Other studies have assessed control more directly, using a behavioural measure. 
Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, and Bradley (2009) assessed executive control using the attentional 
network task, and found that only participants low in control and high in trait anxiety showed 
emotional Stroop interference from threat faces. Salemink and Wiers (2012) used Stroop 
interference as a measure of executive control: adolescents with low control but high state 
anxiety showed the most interpretive bias. On the other hand, Salemink, Friese, Drake, 
Mackintosh, and Hoppitt (2013) assessed working memory (WM) capacity, a strong correlate 
of attentional control, and found that social anxiety only predicted interpretive bias in 
participants with larger WM capacity.  
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All these studies took a correlational approach, assessing how individual differences 
in control moderate the relationship between trait anxiety and cognitive bias. A better test of 
the hypothesis that executive control regulates cognitive bias requires within-participants 
manipulation of executive control (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998). The key prediction is that, 
LQDVLQJOHJURXSRISDUWLFLSDQWVWUDLWDQ[LHW\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLQWHUSUHWLYHRUDWWHQWLRQDO
bias should be clearer when executive control is experimentally impaired. One reliable 
technique for impairing executive attentional control is to impose a WM load, requiring 
participants to retain task-irrelevant information as a secondary task (see Lavie, Hirst, de 
Fockert, & Viding, 2004). A recent study by MacNamara and Proudfit (2014) found that WM 
load exaggerated the differences in distraction by negative images between anxiety patients 
and healthy controls, which is consistent with our hypotheses; however this study did not 
assess biased processing, where threatening and neutral stimuli are present at the same time.  
We therefore conducted two studies to test the hypothesis that WM load moderates 
WUDLWDQ[LHW\¶VLQIOXHQFHRQWKHWZRPRVW-studied cognitive biases. In Study 1, we measured 
negative interpretive bias, using ambiguous vignettes; in Study 2, we measured attentional 
bias to fear-conditioned stimuli. In both cases, we used the WM load manipulation developed 
for impairing cognitive control by Lavie et al. (2004); this manipulation has been previously 
successful in our laboratory (Booth, Mackintosh, Mobini, Oztop, & Nunn, 2014).  
Study 1 
6WXG\WHVWHGWKHK\SRWKHVLVWKDW:0ORDGZRXOGPRGHUDWHWUDLWDQ[LHW\¶VHIIHFWRQD
classic measure of interpretive bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). We focused on trait 
rather than state anxiety in this study, since cognitive bias has been more associated with trait 
anxiety in the literature. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJLYHQDµUHDGLQJFRPSUHKHQVLRQWHVW¶ZKLFK
required them to read a series of ambiguous vignettes, which could be interpreted either as 
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depicting some threat to the central character, or as depicting a benign situation. WM load 
ZDVPDQLSXODWHGGXULQJWKLVWDVN/DWHUSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJLYHQDµPHPRU\WHVW¶WKH\ZHUH
presented with both the threat and the benign interpretations alongside positive and negative 
foil (incorrect) interpretations, and asked which most accurately summarised the vignette. A 
negative interpretive bias is present if the participant is more likely to choose the correct 
negative interpretations over the correct positive interpretations, without being more likely to 
choose the negative foil over the positive foil. This last condition is crucial for avoiding 
wrongly labelling a general negative response bias as a negative interpretive bias (see 
Method).  
$IXUWKHUDGYDQWDJHRI0DWKHZVDQG0DFNLQWRVK¶V(2000) interpretive bias measure is 
that it presents vignettes depicting both social threats (e.g. shunning, mockery) and physical 
threats (e.g. attack, robbery). This is important because previous research has sometimes 
found that anxious individuals only show cognitive biases regarding certain types of threat 
(Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). In particular, social threats may elicit more reliable 
effects than do physical threats (e.g. Helzer et al., 2009; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985); this 
may be because for student samples, which are typically young and relatively affluent, social 
misfortune or loss of reputation are more realistic everyday dangers than are violence or 
illness. This may be particularly true for the current study, which was conducted at a private 
university (i.e., one charging significant tuition fees) in Istanbul. For these reasons, we 
calculated separate bias scores for social and physical threat vignettes, so threat type could be 
included as an independent variable in our analyses.  




Participants. Sixty-eight native Turkish-speaking undergraduates (59 females, mean 
age = 21.37) participated for course credit. The distribution of trait anxiety scores was typical 
for undergraduate samples (see Table 1, cf. Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  
Eleven further participants were dismissed following computer errors, and one gave 
no correct answers to the WM probes in one condition, and so yielded incomplete data (see 
Results for data exclusion).  
Design. A mixed quasi-experimental design was used. WM load (high or low) and 
threat type (physical or social) were manipulated within-participants, and trait anxiety was 
measured as a continuous predictor. The dependent variables were interpretive bias and 
response bias.  
Materials. The study was conducted using E-Prime.  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970) ± trait subscale. This was 
used in its Turkish translation (Öner & LeCompte, 1985)DQGFRQVLVWVRILWHPVHJ³,
ZRUU\DERXWXQLPSRUWDQWWKLQJV´3DUWLFLSDQWVUHVSRQGRQDIRXU-SRLQWVFDOHIURP³DOPRVt 
QHYHU´WR³DOPRVWDOZD\V´2QO\WKHWUDLWDQ[LHW\VFDOHZDVXVHGLQ6WXG\&URQEDFK¶VĮ 
.87 in this sample.  
Interpretive bias assessment. This was adapted from Mathews and Mackintosh (2000, 
Experiment 1), translated into Turkish, and took the form of an incidental memory test. In the 
study phase, participants read 20 vignettes, which could be interpreted as either benign or 
threatening. Half the vignettes portrayed physical threats and half social threats. Each 
vignette had a unLTXHWLWOHZKLFKZDVYLVLEOHWKURXJKRXWWKDWYLJQHWWH¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQ2QH
word in the last sentence was presented as a fragment, which participants had to complete. 
This was followed by a simple comprehension question. The fragment-completion and 
WORKING MEMORY REGULATES COGNITIVE BIAS IN ANXIETY  9 
 
 
comprehension questions were included to ensure participants attended to the vignettes, and 




The Wedding Reception 
A friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You prepare some 
remarks and, when the time comes, get to your feet. As you start to speak, you notice that 
some people in the audience start to l²gh.  
Did you stand up to speak? (Yes/No) 
 
,QWKHWHVWSKDVHSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJLYHQHDFKYLJQHWWH¶VWLWOHDORQJZLWKIRXU
alternative summaries, and were asked to indicate which summary was most accurate. One 






interpretive bias and response bias, i.e. a general tendency to select more negatively valenced 
summaries. Such a response bias would lead participants to select negative targets more than 
positive targets, and negative foils more than positive foils. True interpretive bias would lead 
participants to select negative targets more than positive targets, but would not lead them to 
show any difference in their selection rates of negative and positive foils.  
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Filler task. For the filler task, participants were presented with a two minute movie of 
nature scenes assembled from neutral clips 5004, 5007 and 5008 from the Emotional Movie 
Database (Carvalho, Leite, Galdo-Álvarez, & Gonçalves, 2012).  
Procedure. Participants were tested alone, with instructions to contact the 
experimenter if they had any questions.  
Participants first completed the trait anxiety scale, then the interpretive bias 
DVVHVVPHQW¶V study phase, which was presented as a reading comprehension test. The 
YLJQHWWH¶VWLWOHZDVGLVSOD\HGDWWKHWRSRIWKHVFUHHQZLWKWKHILUVWOLQHEHORZ3DUWLFLSDQWV
revealed the second line by pressing the down arrow key, and so on until the entire vignette 
was displayed onscreen. One word in the final line was presented as a fragment: participants 
pressed the down key when they understood what the complete word was, then typed the first 
missing letter. If they responded incorrectly, the computer showed WKHZRUGµ:521*¶DQG
presented the fragment again; this procedure repeated until the participant responded 
correctly. The comprehension question was then presented, to which participants responded 
µ<HV¶RUµ1R¶$JDLQWKHTXHVWLRQUHSHDWHGXQWLOSDUWLFLSants responded correctly.  
The study phase consisted of two blocks. One randomly-determined block was the 
high WM load block. Participants were presented with six digits for two seconds before each 
vignette; following the comprehension question, participants were presented with a single 
digit, and were asked to indicate with a key-press whether they saw this digit before the 
vignette (new foil digits were presented on 50% of trials, see Lavie et al., 2004). The low 
WM load block was identical except that only one digit was presented before each vignette. 
Ten physical and 10 social threat vignettes were randomly selected for each block, and were 
presented in a random order. An additional four practice vignettes were presented to 
participants, without WM load, before they began the study phase.  
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Next, participants completed the filler task. They were asked to watch the movie 
carefully, as they would be asked about it later (they were not). The filler task took two 
minutes.  
Finally, participants completed the test phase of the interpretive bias assessment. Each 
YLJQHWWH¶VWLWOHZDVDJDLQ presented, along with the four summaries described above. These 
were presented in a random order, and were numbered 1 to 4. Participants pressed the number 
key corresponding to the most accurate summary of the vignette they had read.  
Participants were then thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
For each participant, their probability of selecting each type of summary (i.e. positive 
target, negative target, positive foil or negative foil) was calculated, within each cell of the 
design. Trials where participants answered the WM probe incorrectly (17%) were excluded. 
,QWHUSUHWLYHELDVVFRUHVZHUHFDOFXODWHGIRUHDFKFHOOE\VXEWUDFWLQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶V
probability of selecting the positive target from their probability of selecting the negative 
target. Response bias scores were calculated by subtracting their probability of selecting the 
positive foil from their probability of selecting the negative foil. When the interpretive bias 
index is positive, and the response bias index is not, this indicates a negative interpretive bias. 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 1.  
Bias scores were analysed with a general linear model, with WM load (high or low) 
and threat type (physical or social) as repeated-measures factors, and trait anxiety as a 
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continuous predictor1. We first analysed the response bias scores to ensure that response bias 
would not contaminate our key interpretive bias analyses. There was a marginal effect of 
threat type, F (1, 66) = 3.49, Șp2 = .05, p = .07, indicating that participants selected the 
negative foil more often for social threat items (M bias = -.06) than for physical threat items 
(M bias = -.01); no other effects approached significance, Fs < 2.30, ps > .13. The fact that 
response bias was unaffected by trait anxiety or WM load suggests that any effects of these 
variables on interpretive bias are not contaminated by response bias.  
To test our key predictions, we then subjected interpretive bias scores to the same 
analysis. There was an interaction between WM load and threat type, F (1, 66) = 6.61, Șp2 = 
.09, p = .01; importantly, this was subsumed within a significant three-way interaction, F (1, 
66) = 7.44, Șp2 = .10, p = .008. This interaction resulted from trait anxiety only predicting 
bias in the high load-social threat cell, unstandardised B = .02, 95% CI [.005, .03], p = .006; it 
did not predict bias in the low load-social threat cell, B = -.001, 95% CI [-.01, .01], p = .93, 
nor in either physical threat cell, B = -.01, 95% CI [-.02, .01], p = .47 for high load and B = 
.01, 95% CI [-.003, .02], p = .13 for low load. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.96, ps 
> .16.  
Separate WM load × trait anxiety models for the two threat types confirmed that WM 
ORDGVLJQLILFDQWO\PRGHUDWHGWUDLWDQ[LHW\¶VUHODWLRQship with interpretive bias for social threat 
items, F (1, 66) = 5.49, Șp2 = .08, p = .02 (see Figure 1), but not for physical threat items, F 
(1, 66) = 2.92, Șp2 = .04, p = .09.  




Proc GLM. See http://core.ecu.edu/psyc/wuenschk/MV/RM-
ANOVA/MixedANOVAwContinuousPredictor.doc 
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Anxious individuals have an executive control deficit, which sometimes manifests as 
a reduced WM capacity (e.g. Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). The high WM load condition may 
therefore have depleted the executive control resources of more anxious participants more 
than it did those of less anxious participants, leading to differential effects of load on high 
versus low anxious participants. To investigate this alternative account, we subjected WM 
task accuracy to the same general linear model we used to analyse bias scores above. There 
was the expected main effect of WM load, F (1, 66) = 5.31, Șp2 = .07, p = .02, but the main 
effect of trait anxiety was not significant, F (1, 66) = 2.73, Șp2 = .04, p = .10 and, importantly, 
neither was any interaction effect involving either variable, Fs < 1.10, ps > .30. Analyses of 
performance in the word fragment and comprehension tasks yielded no significant results, Fs 
< 2.18, ps > .14. These null results suggest WM load had equivalent effects on executive 
control resources for all participants.  
Detection theory and choice theory analyses. With memory-based variables such as 
these, it is common to conduct analyses with detection theory-based measures of sensitivity, 
such as d¶+RZHYHUd¶LVXQVXLWDEOHLQWKLVFDVHEHFDXVHLWLVGHVLJQHGWRZRUNwith simple 
detection tasks (e.g. single-stimulus recognition), whereas we have used a four-alternative 
forced-choice task. In these tasks, the simple probability of choosing the correct answer is 
already an unbiased measure of sensitivity (and bias is not estimable; Stanislav & Todorov, 
1999), so the above analyses are appropriate according to detection theory. However, 
MacMillan and Creelman (2005) recommend choice theory (Luce, 1959) for analysing multi-
alternative forced choice data, and present formulae for calculating relative bias, i.e. 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶WHQGHQF\WRVHOHFWRQHUHVponse alternative over one other response alternative. 
This relative bias is clearly appropriate for assessing interpretive and response biases in our 
VWXG\:HFDOFXODWHGLQWHUSUHWLYHELDVDVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRUWKHQHJDWLYHWDUJHWRYHU
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the positive target, and response bias as their preference for the negative foil over the positive 
IRLOXVLQJ0DF0LOODQDQG&UHHOPDQ¶VIRUPXODH:HVXEMHFWHGWKHVHELDVVFRUHVWRWKHVDPH
analyses reported above, and results were consistent with those based on raw response 
probabilities. Specifically, the three-way interaction on interpretive bias was still significant, 
F (1, 66) = 6.33, Șp2 = .09, p = .01, and the same interaction on response bias was still not 
significant, F (1, 66) = 0.47, Șp2 = .007, p = .49.  
Discussion 
In an unselected sample of undergraduates, trait anxiety was related to interpretive 
bias, but only under high WM load. This builds on the work of Salemink and Wiers (2012) 
by showing that a within-participants experimental manipulation of executive control 
FDSDFLW\:0ORDGPRGHUDWHVWUDLWDQ[LHW\¶VHIIHFWVRQLQWHUSUHWLYHELDVDQG supports the 
hypothesis that latent emotion-related biases influence cognition more when available 
executive control resources are scarce (Hofmann et al., 2008; Salemink & Wiers, 2012), 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWK(\VHQFNHWDO¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIFRJQLWLYHELDVHVDVIDLOures of 
H[HFXWLYHFRQWURO7KHVHUHVXOWVDUHDOVRFRQVLVWHQWZLWK2XLPHWHWDO¶V(2009) assertion that 
interpretive bias is a product of associative processing systems which are regulated by 
executive control.  
It is not necessarily surprising that interpretive bias effects were only found with 
social threat items. The participants were students at a small private university; their age and 
socio-economic status may make social threats more of an everyday concern than the threat 
of violence or illness (see Helzer et al., 2009; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Since we 
completed the study, informal questioning of some of these students has confirmed that most 
DUHPXFKPRUHFRQFHUQHGDERXWµVRFLDOGHDWK¶WKDQWKH\DUHDERXWDFWXDOGHDWKSHUKDSVGXH
to their relatively privileged status in Istanbul society. Concern-specific cognitive biases are 
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not an uncommon finding in the anxiety literature (e.g. Mogg et al., 1989); in the future, if 
this study were replicated with a measure of social anxiety, stronger effects may be found. In 
Study 2, we were able to alleviate this problem by using fear-conditioned Japanese characters 
as our threat stimuli, therefore ensuring equivalent relevance of the threat stimuli for all 
participants.  
One criticism of some interpretive bias measures is that they are vulnerable to 
response bias (see Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989). In our task, participants might 
simply select negative summaries during the test phase. These effects are unlikely in the 
current experiment since the key effects involve the WM load factor, which was manipulated 
at encoding, rather than at the response stage. Similarly, high WM load may have impeded 
parWLFLSDQWV¶HQFRGLQJRIWKHVWRULHVIRUFLQJWKHPWRXVHPRUHJXHVVZRUNLQWKHWHVWSKDVH
and trait anxiety may have biased this guesswork rather than the original interpretation. 
However, the fact that our analysis of incorrect responses (response bias scores) yielded such 
different results from our analysis of interpretive bias scores weakens this account. An ideal 
assessment of response bias would require the presentation of completely new vignettes in 
the test phase; the fact we did not do this represents a weakness of this study. Future research 
must include such foil vignettes to fully discount response bias effects.  
Two important issues remained outstanding following Study 1. Firstly, there was the 
SRVVLELOLW\WKDW:0ORDGH[DJJHUDWHGWUDLWDQ[LHW\¶V effects on bias because participants 
found the more difficult WM load anxiogenic, i.e. that WM load was confounded with state 
anxiety. It was important to rule out this alternative account. Secondly, the results did not 
clarify which aspects of affective processing are under executive control. Trait anxiety may 
potentially bias both early reflexive input processes, such as alerting or orienting, or later 
more cognitive processes, such as appraisal, and either could be under the control of WM 
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(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Note that input processes could account for interpretive bias, 
DVWKH\FRXOGELDVWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VDWWHQWLRQWRZDUGWKHPRUHQHJDWLYHDVSHFWVRIWKHYLJQHWWHV
(Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998); Ouimet et al. (2009) suggest that interpretations are a 
product of both conscious processing and implicit associations, i.e. they occur later than the 
input stage. We attempted to resolve these issues in Study 2.  
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend the results of Study 1, using a different bias 
measure: attentional bias to threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). This was 
measured using the dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), in which one threat 
and one neutral stimulus are briefly presented on a computer screen, before one stimulus is 
replaced by a small probe. Attentional bias is indicated where participants respond faster to 
probes replacing the threat stimulus.  
In Study 1, we only found interpretive bias effects with social threat vignettes, and we 
argue above that this is because social threat was more relevant to our participant group. To 
remedy this problem, in Study 2 we fear-conditioned neutral stimuli, to ensure the threat was 
equally relevant for all participants. We used Japanese kanji characters as our conditioned 
threat stimuli; these have the advantage of being novel for Turkish participants, and because 
different characters are conditioned for each participant, threat value is not confounded with 
visual features of the stimulus (Booth & Sharma, 2014; van Damme, Crombez, Hermans, 
Koster, & Eccleston, 2006).  
In Study 1, we were unable to assess whether the WM load itself was experienced as 
stressful by participants. To address this issue, we recorded skin conductance and eyeblink 
muscle activity during the dot probe task: if participants feel more stressed under high load, 
they should show more skin conductance responses and greater eyeblink activity. In 
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particular, we were then able to use these physiological variables as covariates in our 
DQDO\VHVLI:0ORDG¶VPRGHUDWLRQRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDQ[LHW\DQGELDVLVDUHVXOWRI
WKHORDG¶VVWUHVVIXOQDWXUHUDWKHUWKDQWKHORDG¶VLPSDLUPHQWRIHxecutive control, controlling 
for skin conductance or eyeblink muscle activity should nullify the WM load × anxiety 
interaction.  
Study 2 also sought to clarify the results of Study 1 by recording eye movements 
during the dot probe task. Eye movements can provide useful extra information about 
attention-allocation, and may provide a more pure measure of early input processes such as 
alerting and orienting (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2009).  
Finally, in Study 2 we assessed both trait and state anxiety. Although cognitive biases 
are more commonly associated with trait anxiety, state anxiety has sometimes been found to 
moderate this relationship (Waechter & Stolz, 2015). Therefore, we included state anxiety to 
check for such moderation of our hypothesised trait anxiety × WM load interaction.  
Method 
Participants. Fifty-three native Turkish-speaking undergraduates (33 females, M age 
= 21.51) participated for course credit or payment. The distribution of trait anxiety scores was 
VLPLODUWRWKDWIRU6WXG\VHH7DEOH$QDGGLWLRQDOWKUHHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GDWDZHUHH[FOXGHG
GXHWRIDLOXUHVRIWKHSK\VLRORJLFDOHTXLSPHQWDQGRQHDGGLWLRQDOSDUWLFLSDQW¶VGDWDZHUH
excluded due to high influence on the analyses.  
Design. A mixed quasi-experimental design was used. WM load (high or low) was 
manipulated within-participants, and state and trait anxiety were measured as continuous 
predictors. The dependent variables were attentional bias, which was assessed both by using 
traditional RTs and via eye movements (see Eye tracking below). Eyeblink startle 
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electromyogram (EMG) and skin conductance were also recorded, to assess the efficacy of 
conditioning, and for use as covariates in our analyses.  
Materials and measures. 7KHVWXG\ZDVFRQGXFWHGXVLQJ655HVHDUFK¶V([SHULPHQW
Builder software. Participants responded using a Microsoft Sidewinder gamepad. An SR 
Research chin- and forehead-rest was placed 65cm from a 40cm CRT monitor, which was 
running at 75Hz.  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. In Study 2, both the state and trait subscales were 
used. &URQEDFK¶VĮ = .83 for the state scale, and .80 for the trait scale.  
Conditioning phases. Conditioned stimuli (CSs) were 16 Japanese kanji characters, 
taken from the KanjiLearn website 
(http://www2.gol.com/users/jpc/Japan/Kanji/KanjiLearn/). Characters were written in black 
on a square white background. For each of the two conditioning phases, four characters were 
randomly selected to serve as conditioned CS1s, and four to serve as non-conditioned CS2s. 
These CS1s and CS2s then served as threat and non-threat stimuli in the next dot probe 
phase.  
In each conditioning phase, participants passively watched the screen. Eight 
characters were presented for 2000ms each. Half the characters were randomly selected as 
CS1s, and these characters were followed by an unconditioned stimulus (US), which was a 
9100Hz tone, presented at 92dBA for 1000ms. The others were designated as CS2s, and no 
US was presented following these characters. All characters were followed by a blank screen 
for 4500ms.  
Dot probe phases. During the dot probe phases, participants completed dot probe and 
WM tasks simultaneously. Each trial began with the WM study phase: in the high load 
condition, six randomly-determined digits were presented for 2000ms, then masked for 
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2500ms. In the low load condition, one digit was presented for 500ms, then masked for 
750ms. Presentation times were varied to equate encoding difficulty, based on Lavie et al. 
(2004). Digits were presented in white, on a black background. Following this, a central 
fixation was presented for 1000ms. One threat CS1 and one non-threat CS2 character were 
then presented either side of the screen for 100ms. Each CS occupied a square with sides of 
2.73°, centred 6.58° from the centre of the screen. The CSs and their locations were 
randomly-determined for each trial.  A grey double-arrow probe (<<) 0.91° long was then 
presented, pointiQJXSRUGRZQLQRQHRIWKH&6¶VORFDWLRQV7KHGLUHFWLRQDQGORFDWLRQRI
WKHSUREHZDVUDQGRPLVHGIRUHDFKWULDO3DUWLFLSDQWVLQGLFDWHGWKHSUREH¶VGLUHFWLRQDV
quickly as possible, via a button-press with their right thumb. The probe remained onscreen 
until the participant responded. The trial ended with the WM test phase: a single digit was 
presented, and participants were asked whether this digit had been presented in the WM study 
phase. Participants responded via the gamepad. A new, foil digit was presented on 50% of 
trials.  
In each dot probe phase, participants completed 64 trials. Of these 64 trials, the first 
20 were designated as practice trials, and were excluded from analyses.  
Physiological measures. Physiological measures were collected using a BIOPAC 
MP36, sampling at 500Hz. Eyeblink startle EMG and skin conductance responses were 
recorded and analysed in accordance with Society for Psychophysiological Research 
guidelines (Blumenthal et al., 2005; Fowles et al., 1981). EMG was conducted using 11 mm 
Ag/AgCl electrodes, treated with a 7% chloride salt gel and a 35mm adhesive collar. Two 
electrodes were attached over the orbicularis oculi muscle under the right eye, and an isolated 
ground electrode was placed in the centre of the forehead. Skin conductance was measured 
using 11 mm Ag/AgCl electrodes treated with 0.5% chloride salt gel, mounted in a 27 × 
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36mm adhesive patch. These were placed on the distal phalanges of the fourth and fifth 
fingers of the non-dominant hand.  
Eye tracking. Gaze fixation of the dominant eye (determined by Miles test) was 
recorded at 1000Hz during the dot probe phases, using an Eyelink 1000 eye tracker. Only the 
horizontal location of gaze was tracked. A three-point calibration was conducted before each 
dot probe phase, calibrations were accepted if the error was less than 0.5°. Before each trial 
began, a single central fixation point was presented to check drift: calibration was repeated if 
tracking error exceeded 0.5°.  
Procedure. Participants were briefed, and electrodes were applied. During a 10-
minute habituation period, participants completed the anxiety questionnaires, and received 
instructions regarding the dot probe task. They then completed a conditioning phase and a dot 
probe phase, followed by another conditioning phase and dot probe phase. They completed 
one dot probe phase under high WM load, and the other under low WM load. The order of 
load conditions was randomised.  
Efficacy of US. EMG waveforms were high-pass FIR-filtered at 28Hz to remove 
QRLVHWKHQUHFWLILHG7KHZDYHIRUP¶VDUHDZDVFDOFXODWHGIRUWKHPVSHULRGIROORZLQJ
HDFK&6¶VRIIVHW3DUWLFLSDQWs showed more startle blink activity when a US was presented (M 
= 0.062mV·s, SD = 0.16mV·s) than when a US was not presented (M = 0.056mV·s, SD = 
0.16mV·s), mean difference = 0.006, 95% CI [0.001, 0.011], t (52) = 2.46, p = .02.  
Skin conductance waveforms were low-pass FIR-filtered at 1Hz to remove noise, then 
high-pass IIR-filtered at 0.05Hz to remove baseline drift. A skin conductance response was 
recorded wherever the resultant waveform peaked at more than 0.05ȝ63DUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
more likely to make a response when a US was presented (M probability = .62, SD = .28) 
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than when a US was not presented (M = .45, SD = .25), mean difference = .16, 95% CI [.09, 
.24], t (52) = 4.61, p < .001.  
Together, these results indicate that the US was effective.  
Results  
Response times (RTs) less than 1000ms were retained (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & 
Koster, 2010) if participants responded correctly to both the probe and the WM task; using 
alternative outlier criteria did not greatly alter the results. Separate attentional bias scores for 
the high and low WM load conditions were calculated by subtracting the SDUWLFLSDQWV¶PHDQ
57RQWULDOVZKHUHWKHSUREHDSSHDUHGLQWKHWKUHDW&6¶VORFDWLRQIURPWKDWIRUWULDOVZKHUH
the probe appeared in the non-WKUHDW&6¶VORFDWLRQ7KHUHVXOWLQJLQGH[ZKHUHSRVLWLYH
reflects an attentional bias towards threat.  
As before, a repeated-measures general linear model was employed, with attentional 
bias score as the dependent variable, WM load as the factor, and trait anxiety as a continuous 
predictor. There was a main effect of WM load, F  Șp2 = .10, p = .02, so that 
participants generally showed more bias under low load (M = 8.83ms, SD = 21.92ms) than 
they did under high load (M = 2.38ms, SD = 28.83ms), and of trait anxiety, F (1, 51) = 6.20, 
Șp2 = .11, p = .02, so that higher trait anxiety generally predicted more bias to threat. 
Importantly however, there was a significant interaction (see Figure 2), F  Șp2 = 
.08, p = .03, due to the fact that the model parameter for the trait anxiety effect under high 
load was positive and significant, unstandardised B = 1.59, 95% CI [0.53, 2.65], p = .004, 
whereas the parameter for the trait anxiety effect under low load was not significant, B = 
0.06, 95% CI [-0.81, 0.94], p = .89. In other words, Study 2 replicated Study 1¶VEDVLFILQGLQJ
that WM load exaggerates the effect of trait anxiety on bias. When we replicated these 
analyses with state anxiety instead of trait anxiety as the continuous predictor, no effects 
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approached significance, all Fs < 0.46, ps > .50, suggesting that it is trait rather than state 
anxiety which influences RT measures of attentional bias. Similarly, adding both trait and 
state anxiety to the model also yielded no significant effects, all Fs < 1.46, ps > .23.  
To check whether these effects could be simply explained by the stressful effects of 
WM load, we calculated the difference between the mean probability of a skin conductance 
response under high load and the mean probability of a skin conductance response under low 
load. One-sample t-tests indicated that participants did indeed show more responses during 
the high WM load study phase, M difference = .27, 95% CI [.22, .32], p < .001, and during 
the high WM load test phase, M difference = .03, 95% CI [.01, .06], p = .003. However, 
participants showed less responses under high WM load during the actual dot probe 
component of the task, M difference = -.06, 95% CI [-.11, -.02], p = .006. Most importantly, 
including the difference in response probability for any of these three phases as a covariate in 
our model did not weaken our key interaction, all Fs > 4.26, ps < .05, suggesting that 
emotional responses to the WM load itself were not driving our interaction between WM load 
and trait anxiety on attentional bias. Similarly, participants showed an eye-blink EMG 
waveform of greater area during the high WM load study phase, M difference = .024, 95% CI 
[.004, .044], p = .02, although not during the test phase, M difference = .01, 95% CI [-.002, 
.013], p = .14, or during the dot probe phase, M difference = .00, 95% CI [-.003, .001], p = 
.47. Again, including the difference in EMG waveform area for any of these three phases as a 
covariate in our model did not weaken our key interaction, all Fs > 4.69, ps < .04.  
Eye movements. Next, we checked to see if these RT effects corresponded to eye 
movements, concentrating on trials where the probe appeared in the non-WKUHDW&6¶V
location. Trials with blinks or other tracking losses were discarded. We then calculated the 
proportion of trials where, if a saccade was made, that saccade was made in the direction of 
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the probe. These proportions were used to calculate an attentional bias index, by subtracting 
the proportion for trials where the probe appeared in the non-WKUHDW&6¶VORFDWLRQIURPWKH
proportion for trials wheUHWKHSUREHDSSHDUHGLQWKHWKUHDW&6¶VORFDWLRQ$JDLQWKLVELDV
was calculated separately for each WM load condition.  
These eye movement bias scores were analysed with the same WM load × trait 
anxiety general linear model as used for the RT analyses above. The main effect of trait 
anxiety was not significant, F (1, 49) = 2.35Șp2 = .05, p = .13, and neither was the main 
effect of load, F (1, 49) = 0.96Șp2 = .02, p = .33; although the parameter for trait anxiety was 
somewhat larger under high load, B = 0.006, 95% CI [0.000, 0.012], p = .06, than it was 
under low load, B = 0.002, 95% CI [-0.004, 0.008], p = .53, the WM load × trait anxiety 
interaction did not reach significance, F (1, 49) = 1.66Șp2 = .03, p = .20. However, when the 
analysis was repeated with state anxiety as the continuous predictor instead of trait anxiety, 
the main effect of state anxiety was significant, F  Șp2 = .13, p = .01, indicating 
that more state anxious participants were more likely to make a saccade to probes when they 
DSSHDUHGLQWKHWKUHDW&6¶VORFDWLRQ7KHUHZHUHQRRWKHUVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWVFs < 0.70, ps > 
.40. When both trait and state anxiety were included in the model, no effects reached 
significance, all Fs < 2.21, all ps > .14.  
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated and extended the results of Study 1. We ensured that our threat 
stimuli were relevant to all participants, by using fear-conditioned Japanese kanji as stimuli. 
Trait anxiety was only related to attentional bias to threat under high working memory load. 
Psychophysiological measurements indicated that this effect was not simply due to emotional 
responses to the WM load itself. These results support the hypothesis that biased processing 
of emotional information is regulated by executive control processes.  
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Interestingly, anxiety and WM load differentially predicted attentional bias as 
measured with RTs, as opposed to eye movements: only trait anxiety predicted RT attentional 
bias and only under high WM load, but only state anxiety predicted eye movement attentional 
bias, and this was not moderated by WM load. Discrepancies between RT and eye movement 
data are not unheard of in the anxiety literature (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Broomfield 
& Turpin, 2005; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). Eye movements potentially give a more 
accurate assessment of overt, early-stage attentional orienting than do RTs (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2009), as RTs can be affected by both early attentional and later computational and 
response processes (Santee & Egeth, 1982). As WM load did not influence eye movements in 
this study, we tentatively suggest that executive control regulates these later processes, 
probably including appraisal, and does not so strongly regulate earlier processes such as 
orienting towards threat. Further support for this notion comes from the fact that eye 
movements to threat were associated with state rather than trait anxiety: evidence suggests 
that state anxiety is more closely associated with alerting and orienting, whereas trait anxiety 
is more closely associated with overall executive control deficits (Bishop et al., 2007; 
Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas, & Lupiáñez, 2010). Note that these eye movement 
results do not invalidate our interpretation of the RT data, because attention is able to operate 
independently from eye movements (e.g. Corbetta, 1998). Further research is needed to 
elucidate the relationships between biased attention and biased eye movements in state and 
trait anxiety.  
The results of Study 2 are apparently at odds with those of Schoorl et al. (2014), who 
IRXQGWKDWSRVWWUDXPDWLFVWUHVVGLVRUGHUSDWLHQWV¶V\PSWRPVHYHULW\SUHGLFWHGDWWHQWLRQDOELDV
away from threat, rather than towards threat, in patients with poorer attentional control 
ability. The results of these two studies are, however, quite compatible. It has often been 
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found that anxious individuals first attend towards, and then away from, threat stimuli 
('vigilance-avoidance', see Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; 
Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Onnis, Dadds, & Bryant, 2011). The present study 
used a short interval between the threat stimuli and the probe (100ms), and was therefore 
more likely to find vigilance for threat in more trait anxious participants. Schoorl et al. used a 
longer interval of 500ms, which has sometimes produced avoidance in previous studies (e.g. 
Koster et al., 2006). Importantly, although avoidance of threat has been assumed to be a 
strategic coping mechanism (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), recent evidence suggests that 
avoidance of threat can also occur ballistically and unintentionally: Booth (2014) found that 
avoidance of threat correlated negatively with a meaVXUHRIH[HFXWLYHFRQWURO%RRWK¶VUHVXOWV
VXJJHVWWKDW6FKRRUOHWDO¶VUHVXOWVUHIOHFWDVLPLODUSDWWHUQWRWKRVHRIWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\
6FKRRUOHWDOVLPSO\VDPSOHGWKHLUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWHQWLRQDWDODWHUSRLQWLQWLPHZKHUH
avoidance was more likely to be observed rather than vigilance.  
Relatedly, note that the short interval between threat and probe stimuli used in the 
present study does not allow the participant much time for reactive shifts of attention. 
Similarly, Bardeen and Orcutt (2011) manipulated this interval and found that posttraumatic 
stress symptom severity and attentional control only interacted on attentional bias when the 
threat-probe interval was 150ms, this interaction was not significant when the interval was 
500ms. It could be argued that 100-PVLVQRWHQRXJKWLPHWRUHJLVWHUWKHWKUHDW¶VORFDWLRQ
and shift attention accordingly. In fact this may be true, but such reactive shifts of attention 
are not important for performance in the dot probe task. In this task, optimum performance 
requires the participant to ignore the threat and neutral stimuli completely, and hold their 
attention on the centre of the screen, so as to detect and identify the probe as quickly as 
possible. Therefore, attentional control can be applied pre-emptively, to inhibit any shift of 
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attention towards (or away from) the threat stimulus. Indeed, attentional control theory 
specifies that attentional bias represents a failure to inhibit attentional shifts towards threat. It 
is therefore expected that executive control would moderate attentional bias even at short 
threat-SUREHLQWHUYDOV0RUHVXUSULVLQJLV%DUGHHQDQG2UFXWW¶VIDLOXUHWRGHWHFWWKHHIIHFW
with a longer interval of 500ms: these authors suggest that the longer interval allows more 
WLPHIRUDWWHQWLRQWRµVOLS¶(Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004) to the threat stimulus, 
UHJDUGOHVVRIWKHLQLWLDOOHYHORIFRQWUROHPSOR\HG1RWHKRZHYHUWKDW6XVD3LWLFă%HQJDDQG
Miclea (2012) found that attentional control did negatively predict bias with an interval of 
500ms in a sample of children.  
General Discussion 
7KHVHWZRVWXGLHVVKRZHGWKDW:0ORDGPRGHUDWHVWUDLWDQ[LHW\¶VLQIOXHQFHRQ
cognitive biases, supporting the hypothesis that executive control can regulate biased 
processing of emotional information. Although correlational studies have previously 
suggested this might be the case (e.g. Helzer et al., 2009; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2009; 
Salemink & Wiers, 2012), these studies go one step further by directly manipulating control 
within-subjects. In two studies with different samples and dependent measures, trait anxiety 
did not predict threat bias under low WM load, but did predict bias in the same participants 
under high WM load. However, this only seemed to be the case when the threat stimuli had 
some relevance for the participants. Study 2 further suggested that control regulates later 
cognitive processing, perhaps including appraisal, rather than initial, more reflexive processes 
such as alerting and orienting. Practically speaking, these studies show that WM loads can 
exaggerate cognitive biases and so are a useful tool for affective scientists requiring accurate 
assessments of threat processing, unbiased by the effects of executive control. Theoretically 
VSHDNLQJWKHVHVWXGLHVVXSSRUWDWWHQWLRQDOFRQWUROWKHRU\¶V(Eysenck et al., 2007) assertion 
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that cognitive biases represent a failure of cognitive control (see also Bishop et al., 2007; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ouimet et al., 2009). Clinically, they reinforce the claim that 
executive control may constitute a protective factor against high trait anxiety, and that 
weaknesses of control may lead to exaggerated threat-processing biases in anxious patients.  
Another model which posits a role for cognitive control in cognitive bias is the model 
of Mathews and Mackintosh (1998), which conceptualises bias as the result of competing 
representations: representations of the threat stimulus, neutral stimulus, and probe in the case 
of attentional bias, and representations of the positive and negative interpretations in the case 
RILQWHUSUHWLYHELDV7KHPRGHOLQFOXGHVDQµHIIRUWIXOWDVNGHPDQG¶XQLWZKLFKLVDEOHWR
boost the activation of the probe stimulus/positive interpretation in situations where there is 
little actual danger. This aspect of the model seems consistent with our findings. However, 
another assumption of this model is that both state and trait anxiety influence bias by 
PRGXODWLQJWKHDFWLYLW\RIDµWKUHDWHYDOXDWLRQV\VWHP¶ZKLFKPRQLWRUVDOOLQFRPLQJVWLPXOL
for potential danger. This is inconsistent with the dissociation between trait and state anxiety 
effects on RTs in our Study 2. Evidence supports the notion that trait and state anxiety may 
have differentiable effects on cognition (Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010); further research is 
required to fully investigate this difference with regard to both performance-based and eye 
movement-based biases.  
Clinically, these results are important because they evidence an indirect link between 
biased processing of threat and executive control deficits in trait anxiety. Executive control 
deficits do not directly bias processing, but they do increase the chance of latent biases 
manifesting themselves. This is consistent with neuroimaging evidence suggesting that 
processing threat information is unavoidable, but can be modulated according to task 
demands (Mathews, Yiend, & Lawrence, 2004).  
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Given that both interpretive and attentional biases help cause or maintain trait anxiety 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000), these results also imply that poor executive control may increase vulnerability to 
anxiety disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ouimet et al., 2009). Indeed, this hypothesis 
has been tested in correlational studies. Susa et al. (2012) found that attentional bias to threat 
faces only predicted anxiety in children with low attentional control. Of course, the 
correlational studies reviewed in the Introduction, which appear to show that trait anxiety 
more strongly predicts cognitive bias when control is low, may equally show that bias more 
strongly predicts trait anxiety when control is low. A potential mechanism is implied by the 
findings of Bardeen and Read (2010) and Compton (2000), who found that attentional control 
predicted resilience to and recovery from negative emotion. Preliminary investigations have 
begun into executive control training programmes as a potential therapy for emotional 
disorders (Owens, Koster, & Derakshan, 2013; although see Onraedt & Koster, 2014). It is 
not a circular argument to say that impaired executive control makes threat bias clearer in 
more anxious people, therefore impaired executive control can make people more anxious. 
Firstly, evidence suggests that trait anxiety and cognitive bias exacerbate one another in a 
feedback loop (see Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & 
White, 1995), so any increase in bias expression may lead to increased anxiety. Indeed, this is 
why improving executive control through training may ameliorate anxiety, by reducing the 
expression of cognitive biases; in this way it may interrupt one factor maintaining the 
anxiety. Secondly, we are arguing that impaired executive control can exaggerate individual 
differences in cognitive bias: therefore impaired executive control may increase an individual 
with somewhat elevated trait DQ[LHW\¶VULVNRIGHYHORSLQJFOLQLFDODQ[LHW\ 
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One puzzling aspect of both these studies is the fact that trait anxiety was not related 
to cognitive bias under low WM load. Many studies which did not employ any kind of WM 
or cognitive load have found significant attentional or interpretive bias in anxious groups, so 
why were these effects absent here? The most obvious answer is that these studies might be 
under-powered in the low WM load condition. Attentional bias in particular, although 
replicated in dozens of studies, is known to have a relatively modest effect size (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007) and to be somewhat unreliable (Waechter & Stolz, 2015; Zvielli, Bernstein, & 
Koster, 2014). Studies of cognitive bias also tend to employ extreme-groups designs, 
selecting participants to be high or low on trait anxiety, which inflates power relative to 
correlational studies such as ours (e.g. Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). 
Bar-Haim et al. report a meta effect size of d = 0.38 for dot probe studies assessing the 
difference in bias between anxious and non-anxious groups. This is equivalent to a 
correlation r of .19 (Rosenthal, 1994), and a sample of 53 participants only has power of 
approximately .27 to detect an effect of this size. This is not however a weakness of the 
present studies, as our intent was not to assess the presence of bias ± many studies have 
already established this ± but to assess whether WM load would moderate bias. This 
highlights the utility of WM loads in cognitive bias research: the present studies suggest that 
applying a WM load may make biases more detectable in smaller and/or less extremely trait 
anxious samples.  
Our findings that trait anxiety-related cognitive biases are more likely to manifest 
themselves when executive control processes are impaired are important for theories of 
cognitive biases, and potentially for understanding the aetiology of anxiety itself. The 
generalisability of our findings is limited by our fairly small, nonclinical samples; however, 
cognitive bias effects are typically comparable between patient and anxious analogue groups 
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(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Furthermore, the mechanism by which WM load moderates bias is 
unclear; the concept of executive control has often been under-specified in the cognitive bias 
literature (although see Eysenck et al., 2007). Further research is needed to understand which 
aspects of executive control are most important for regulating biased cognition and threat-
processing, and whether other cognitive biases seen in trait anxiety ± and indeed cognitive 
biases seen in other conditions and affective states ± are regulated in the same way.  
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Descriptive statistics for interpretive and response bias scores, Study 1. A more positive 
score indicates a more negative bias. 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. N = 68.  
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 M SD 
1. Trait anxiety -.089 .331** .184 -.011 .041 .147 -.152 .122 42.96 8.99 
2. Interpretive bias, high 
load, physical threat 
 .039 .199 .250* .095 .090 .091 .093 -.16 .54 
3. Interpretive bias, high 
load, social threat 
  .147 .117 .190 .088 .040 .158 -.12 .49 
4. Interpretive bias, low 
load, physical threat 
   .121 .240* .073 .197 .110 -.08 .44 
5. Interpretive bias, low 
load, social threat 
    .272* .007 .350** .167 -.09 .42 
6. Response bias, high 
load, physical threat 
     .170 .155 -.009 .02 .28 
7.   Response bias, high 
load, social threat 
      -.014 .155 -.04 .26 
8.   Response bias, low 
load, physical threat 
       .313** -.04 .22 
9.   Response bias, low 
load, social threat 
        -.08 .23 




Descriptive statistics for attentional bias as assessed with response times (RTs) and eye 
movements, Study 2. A more positive attentional bias indicates greater attention towards the 
threat stimulus.  
 2 3 4 5 6 M SD 
1. Trait anxiety .426** .389** .020 .205 .113 39.74 7.06 
2. State anxiety  -.010 -.122 .289* .337* 38.62 7.04 
3. Attentional bias (RTs), high load  -.048 -.025 .032 2.38 28.83 
4. Attentional bias (RTs), low load   .134 -.021 8.83 21.92 
5. Attentional bias (eye movements), high load   .442** .19 .16 
6. Attentional bias (eye movements), low load    .16 .15 










Relationship between trait anxiety and interpretive bias under high (solid line) and low 
(broken line) working memory load, for social threat items only. A more positive interpretive 
bias score indicates a greater tendency towards threatening interpretations.  
 




Relationship between trait anxiety and attentional bias under high (solid line) and low 
(broken line) working memory load. A more positive attentional bias score indicates more 
attentional bias to threat as opposed to neutral stimuli. 
 
